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SUPREME COURT- STATE OF NEW YORK 
DUTCHESS COUNTY 
Present: 
Hon. MARIA G. ROSA 
Petitioner, 
-against-
TINA M. STANFORD, Chair of the New York 




AND JUDGMENT . 
Index No: 2789/15 
The following papers were read and considered on this Article 78 petition. 
NOTICE OF PETITION 
PETITION 
EXHIBITS A-F 
ANSWER AND RETURN 
EXHIBITS 1-9 
Petitioner brought this proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 to review a determination 
of the Board of Parole denying his request for parole release. In 1976 petitioner was convicted after 
a jury trial of murder in the second degree, manslaughter in the first degree, burglary in the second 
degree, grand larceny in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and 
other lesser offenses. Judgment was reversed on appeal, but in 1981 he was again convicted of the 
same offenses and sentenced to an aggregate term of25 years to life. The convictions stemmed from 
the petitioner's participation in a burglary during which he shot and killed a police officer. Petitioner 
first became eligible for parole release in June 2000. On December 9, 2014 he appeared before the 
parole board for his eighth appearance. He was 68 years old and had been incarcerated nearly 40 
years for his offenses of conviction, almost 15 years beyond the controlling minimum term of his 
indefinite sentence. 
Pursuant to Executive Law §259-i(2)( c), the New York State Board of Parole is required to 
consider a number of statutory factors in determining whether an inmate should be released to parole. 
See Matter of Miller v. NYS Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d 690 (2"d Dept. 2010). The parole board must 
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also consider whether "there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live 
and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not incompatible with the 
welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for 
the law." 9 NYCRR 8002.1. A parole board is not required to give equal weight to each statutory 
factor, nor is it required specifically to articulate every factor considered. See Matter of Huntley v. 
Evans, 77 AD3d 945 (2"d Dept. 2010). It is further permitted to place a greater emphasis on the 
gravity of offense committed. See Matter of Serrano v. Alexander, 70 AD3d 1099, 1100 (3"' Dept. 
2010). However, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, a parole board may not deny release 
solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense. Huntley v. Evans, 77 AD3d at 94 7; King v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (l" Dept. 1993). Moreover, while the board need 
not consider each guideline separately and has broad discretion to consider the importance of each 
factor, the board must still consider the guidelines. Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(a). Finally, the board 
must inform the inmate in writing of the factors and reasons for denial of parole and"[ s ]uch reasons 
shall be given in detail and not in conclusoryterms." Executive Law §259-i(2)(a); Malone v. Evans, 
83 .AD3d 719 (2"d Dept. 2011 ). A determination by a parole board whether or not to grant parole is · 
discretionary, and if made in accordance with the relevant statutory factors, is not subject to judicial 
review absent "a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety." Matter of Russo v. NYS Bd. 
of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 (1980). 
Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended in 2011 to require the board to establish new 
procedures to use in making parole determinations. The statutory amendment was intended to have 
parole boards focus on an applicant's rehabilitation and future rather than giving undue weight to 
the crime of conviction and the inmate's pre-incarceration behavior. To assist the members of the 
board in taking this approach when making parole determinations, the amendment required the 
establishment of written guidelines incorporating risk and needs principles to measure an inmate's 
rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon release. See Ramirez v. Evans, 118 AD3d 707 (2"d 
Dept. 2014). In response, the board of parole adopted the COMPAS (Correctional Offender 
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanction) assessment tool. A COMPAS assessment was 
prepared in connection with petitioner's December 9, 2014 appearance before the parole board. 
At petitioner's parole hearing, the board questioned him about his crimes of conviction, 
length of incarceration, acceptance of responsibility and remorse for his offenses, institutional 
achievements and prospects for employment and housing upon release. Petitioner discussed with the 
board that he began developing a victim's advocacy program in 1983, and that in 1997 he started the 
first victim awareness program in Green Haven Correctional Facility in honor of the police officer 
he had killed. The board acknowledged that petitioner had received a Bachelor of Science in 
Commerce from Niagra University in 1987 and Associate Degrees in Science and Arts from the 
Clinton Community College in 1979. The board further noted petitioner's achievements including 
adult peer counseling, pre-release counseling, working as a typist, doing legal research, welding, 
substance abuse program participation and as an apprentice baker. Petitioner received in excess of 
60 letters of recommendation for release on his behalf including letters from individuals working in 
law enforcement. The board commented that petitioner's disciplinary record of no infractions for a 




for felony violence, arrest or absconding. Following the hearing, the board issued a decision denying 
parole. The decision recognized that the offenses of conviction were petitioner's only felonies of 
record, that his institutional programming indicated progress and achievement, that he had a clean 
disciplinary record and that there was significant community support for his release. The decision 
also noted "significant community opposition" to his release. Stating that the requisite statutory 
factors had been considered including petitioner's risk to the community, rehabilitation efforts and 
his needs for successful community re-entry, the board denied release. The stated reason was that 
it would not be compatible with the welfare of society at large and would depreciate the seriousness 
of the instant offenses and undermine respect for the law. 
The record before the court reveals that the parole board considered the statutory factors set 
forth in Executive Law §259-i. However, the final determination to deny parole release and its 
conclusory statement that petitioner's release would not be compatible with the welfare of society 
and would depreciate the seriousness of his crimes of conviction is not supported by an application 
of )he factual record to the statutory factors. Petitioner had no felony record at the time of his 
conviction, unquestionably exhibited acceptance of responsibility and remorse for his actions, had 
an exemplary record of institutional achievements, had no institutional infractions for over 35 years 
and his CO"MP AS assessment indicated he was a low risk forre-arrest or criminal involvement upon 
release. It found substance abuse or personality disorders to be unlikely and that he has family 
support and financial prospects upon release. 
The court is cognizant that it is not its function to substitute its own judgment for that of a 
parole board. See generally, Matter of Cowan v. Kern. 41NY2d591 (1977). However, where an 
administration agency reaches a conclusion entirely unsupported by the factual record before it, a 
rational basis for the determination does not exist. It is clear to this court that the parole board's 
determination was based exclusively on the severity of petitioner's offense. A parole board is not 
entitled to exclusively rely on the severity of an offense to deny parole, as such a determination 
contravenes the discretionary scheme mandated by statute and constitutes an unauthorized re-
sentencing of the defendant. See Matter of King v. NYS Division of Parole, 190 AD2d 423 (1" Dept. 
1993 ). The parole board is not allowed to employ its own penal philosophy in making determinations 
as such factor is in encompassed within Executive Law §259-i(2)(c). To the extent that the board's 
determination here is based upon letters of community opposition, respondent has failed to 
demonstrate a rational basis for the challenged determination. Neither the letters nor a description 
of their content is before this court. Petitioner suggested at his parole hearing that the letters were 
written from police benevolent association groups who did not know the victim or petitioner and 
have no first-hand knowledge of the facts underlying his conviction. Accordingly, any such letters 
would reflect opposition to release based on penal philosophy; namely that individuals convicted of 
killing a police officer should never obtain parole release. This is not law and members of the parole 
board are not permitted to apply their own penal philosophy in determining whether release is 
appropriate. Thus, it is beyond cavil that the parole board may not deny parole based solely on letters 
from unknown third parties expressing their penal philosophies. Finding no rational support in the 
record before this court for respondent's determination, it is hereby 
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ORDERED that the board's determination dated December 15, 2014 denying petitioner 
parole release is vacated and the matter is remanded to the parole board to make a de nova 
determination on petitioner's request for parole release. It is further 
ORDERED that none of the individual members on the parole board that rendered that 
challenged determination shall participate in the parole hearing to be held upon remand. 
This constitutes the decision, order and judgment of this court. 
Dated: October 1 ,2015 
Poughkeepsie, New York 
Kindlon Shanks & Associates 
Kathy Manley, Esq. 
7 4 Chapel Street 
Albany NY 12207 
State of New York 
Office of the Attorney General 
Attn: J. Gardner Ryan, Asst. Attorney General 
One Civic Center Plaza, Suite 40 I 
Poughkeepsie NY 12601-3157 
EN~ 
~ 
MARIA G. ROSA, J.S.C. 
Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 671.5, please be advised that you have the right to appeal, or to apply for 
permission to appeal, this order to the Appellate Division. Your notice of appeal must be filed at the 
Dutchess County Clerk's Office, 22 Market Street, Poughkeepsie, New York 12601. Upon proof 
of your financial inability to retain counsel and pay the cost and expenses of the appeal, you have 
the right to apply to the appellate court for assignment of counsel and leave to prosecute the appeal 
as a poor person. CPLR Section 5513 provides that an appeal may be taken, or motion for 
permission to appeal may be made, within thirty (30) days after the entry and service of any order 
or judgment from which the appeal is taken, or sought to be taken, and written notice of its entry. 
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